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ABSTRACT: The main objective of this paper is to analyse the effect of electricity regulation 
on economic growth. Although the relationship between electricity consumption and economic 
growth has been extensively analysed in the empirical literature, this framework has not been 
used to estimate the effect of electricity regulation on economic growth. Understanding this 
effect is essential for the assessment of regulatory policy. Specifically, we assess the effects of 
two major regulations, renewable energy promotion costs and network cost, on electricity 
consumption and growth. A dataset for the period 2007-2013 and 22 European countries was 
compiled based on CEER reports and EUROSTAT databases. The results of the empirical 
analysis show that the two regulation instruments have a negative effect on electricity 
consumption and economic growth and provide estimates of their effects on growth in 
quantitative terms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade it has become evident that the energy sector is in a turning point, a new 
model is required to face the challenges of the upcoming years. The required transformation of 
the traditional energy model, especially with regard to the environmental effects, has led to an 
inevitable and profound regulatory reform. From a regulatory perspective, the energy sector 
has witnessed a high level of activity at the European level. Three consecutive packages were 
adopted aiming at harmonising and liberalising the European Union (EU) internal energy 
market. In addition, the climate and energy package set ambitious targets for 2020 in terms of 
emissions reduction, penetration of renewables and energy efficiency. Climate and energy as an 
integrated policy within the EU has led to the trilemma of targets: competitiveness, 
sustainability, and security of supply. More recently, the European Commission has defined the 
2050 roadmap and the 2030 targets as an intermediate step in energy and climate policy to 
achieve sustainable economic growth.  
Unfortunately, the objectives pursued by the climate and energy policy of the EU –
environmental sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness- are difficult to achieve 
simultaneously and even more if they are supported on market forces only. Therefore, priorities 
need to be set. When the energy policy objectives are analysed in detail, it becomes apparent 
that the environmental dimension has played an important role. Nevertheless, the economic 
crisis and its undesirable effects on the capacity of European economies to grow and create 
wealth, have increased the attention on competitiveness as one of the main concerns in the 
policy agenda. It is fundamental for industrial development and economic growth that European 
firms preserve or improve its competitiveness. Within this context -and having in mind the other 
energy policy objectives, since firms must compete in difficult environments-, the basic question 
is on the role of energy in the operating cost and in the competitiveness. 
The increasing concern in Europe about the recent evolution of energy costs and prices and its 
impact on the industrial competitiveness is observable in the 2014 EU Communication 'For a 
European Industrial Renaissance'.  Every day it becomes more important to secure an affordable 
access to energy and raw materials, since these are an important part of the costs in many 
industries. In so far as the evolution of energy costs negatively influences the competitiveness 
of energy intensive industries, it is fundamental to avoid disproportionate increases of those 
costs as a consequence of taxes, levies or other instruments introduced by Member States to 
enforce different policies. This is essential to guarantee a good cost-effectiveness relation and 
contribute to improve EU competitiveness. Therefore, the assumption of the upcoming 
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objectives must follow an approach of costs effectiveness -affordable and competitive-, 
ensuring the security of supply and sustainability, while taking into account the current 
economic and political context.   
The main objective of this paper is to analyse the effect of electricity regulation on economic 
growth. Understanding this effect is deemed essential for the assessment of regulatory policy. 
Specifically, we assess the effects of two major regulations, renewable energy promotion costs 
and industrial network cost, on electricity consumption and GDP. In this analysis we assume 
that this impact takes place though the influence of regulation on electricity consumption.  
To carry out the empirical estimation, a database for the period 2007-2013 and 22 European 
countries has been compiled based on EUROSTAT database and Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) reports. The information for 22 countries and 7 years allows us to have an 
appropriate panel of data. The contribution of this paper to the literature is as follows. First, 
instead of analysing the effects of regulation on economic growth directly, we use a system of 
two equations to take into account the fact that electricity regulation potentially affects 
economic growth through its impact on electricity consumption. This procedure helps to 
improve our understanding of the mechanisms regarding the effects of electricity regulation on 
growth. Second, many papers focus on only one specific instrument. Instead, we consider the 
two main regulatory instruments, the renewable energy promotion costs and the networks 
costs and therefore we can compare their effects. Third, to include both instruments has 
required the construction of a novel and comparable measure of renewable promotion costs for 
22 European countries. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the background on the link we 
explore latter in the empirical exercise between regulation, electricity consumption and 
economic growth. In Section 3 the model, variables and methods are detailed described. Section 
4 informs and discuss the empirical analysis results. Finally, Section 5 holds the conclusions and 
policy implication derived from the performed analysis. 
 
2. BACKGROUND: REGULATION, ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Despite its relevance for the analysis of regulatory policies, the academic literature has devoted 
little attention to the relationship between electricity regulation and economic growth. This is 
mainly attributable to the fact that this relationship is not a direct one, but rather it is mediated 
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through the effect that regulation has on the consumption of electric energy. The mechanism at 
work in this relationship is the following; electricity is an economic factor of great relevance 
since it is a key input in the modern production process, having its consumption a significant 
impact on a company’s production costs and, hence, on economic growth. Next, we provide 
background and fundamentals for our modelling approach based, first, on the link between 
regulation and electricity consumption (emphasising on the conceptual framework), and 
second, on the relation between electricity consumption and economic growth.  
2.1. Regulation and electricity consumption 
This research starts from the assumption that the price system is a useful mechanism to 
transmit relevant information having an impact on consumers behaviour, also in the European 
context. Whether a depletion of an existing resource, an increasing scarcity of a non-renewable 
energy or an arbitrage opportunity in some market, all the relevant information is usually 
transmitted through the price, through variations in price levels that make agents react to the 
changes by changing, for instance, their consumption.  
Among the various economic activities, the electricity sector is characterised for being one of 
the most highly regulated sectors. In the framework of liberalisation, being pushed forward in 
January 1997 with the publication of EC Directive 96/92/EC of 19 December, the regulatory 
changes affecting the electricity sector have been especially intense and have had an enormous 
impact on the structure of the sector and its business agents, as well as on the functioning of 
the electricity market itself.  
Under this process, the regulatory function appears as a key element, being responsible for the 
definition of the framework that guarantees the correct technical management of the power 
system, the coordination of the networks and the transparency of access conditions for all the 
agents participating in the power market. In other words, in this process of liberalisation 
competition and regulation represent the two sides of the same coin. Real competition in power 
markets cannot be fully achieved without ensuring non-discriminatory network access and 
market functioning at the wholesale and retail levels. Economic regulation must guarantee the 
recovery of all regulated costs in order to ensure the economic viability of the power system. In 
this context, energy regulation has a significant economic impact, which has to be considered 
ex-ante when designing energy policy initiatives. 
Evaluating the economic impact of the regulation of the electricity sector and of the changes in 
these regulations is a complex task. The assessment and measurement of the impact of the 
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reform processes and regulatory changes have been analysed in the relevant literature with 
different general approaches. 
The first is a macroeconomic approach focusing on the analysis of regulatory policies and their 
impact within the framework of general equilibrium theory (Chisari and Estache, 1999). 
Contributors using this approach constructed general equilibrium models in an attempt to 
capture first- and second-order effects to establish, identify and quantify transmission 
mechanisms and the overall effects of a specific regulatory policy or measure on economic 
growth, through the modelling of the behaviour of economic agents. The analysis of the impact 
of regulatory policies with general equilibrium models is intuitively attractive as it allows the 
quantification of, both, direct and indirect economic effects. However, these models are 
characterised by an enormous complexity and the constraints placed on any formulation, 
implementation and description, given the need to simplify the hypotheses governing the 
transmission mechanisms. This limitation warns against their use when the aim is to analyse the 
impact of specific actions in the regulatory domain. 
The second approach has involved the quantitative evaluation of a country’s regulatory 
framework. This provides a better understanding of the risks, particularly the regulatory ones. 
Such an evaluation of the regulatory framework is useful in a number of ways: it enables 
comparisons to be made; it identifies possible improvements; and it facilitates the evaluation of 
the impact of implementing new measures. The evaluation is not without its difficulties (Becker, 
2009) since it requires access to measurable parameters that allow an analysis of their evolution 
over time as well as a comparative analysis of regulatory frameworks. 
Given that all regulatory actions seek to achieve a significant improvement in the provision of 
electric power supply, a third set of studies has attempted to assess the effects of regulatory 
changes based on the measurement and evaluation of outcomes – the so-called performance 
metrics approach – in terms of price, accessibility, quality and efficiency in the provision of the 
service (Cubbin and Stern, 2006; Pollitt, 2009). This approach has been widely used in academic 
studies for evaluating the impact of regulatory changes based on the results obtained in terms 
of pricing, consumption, investment, service quality or the evolution in greenhouse gases 
emissions, among others. 
Agreed the limitations of the first two approaches, the general framework provided by the third 
approach has been used in this paper. This framework is deemed suitable to address the issues 
raised in the introduction as well as to capture the flexibility required by the diversity of 
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contexts in which the effect of electricity regulation is to be assessed. Several regulatory 
variables have been considered as key drivers of electricity consumption, the focus of this paper 
is on the two specific regulated components of the electricity retail price. This choice is 
motivated by their weight in retail electricity price, and consequently, the potential relevance of 
their impact on electricity consumption. On average for the 22 European countries included in 
our sample, during the period 2007-2013 the promotion costs related to the support for RES-E 
and the network costs represented respectively 11% and 23% of the retail price faced by 
industrial consumers. In the context of this study, given that the mechanism through which 
regulation affect consumption is via regulated components of retail price, a negative relation is 
expected between the regulatory variables and electricity consumption. 
2.2. Electricity consumption and growth 
The relationship between electricity consumption and economic growth has been extensively 
analysed in the empirical literature. Understanding the links and the direction of causality 
between these two variables has important implications for the design of energy and 
environmental policies.  
As recent reviews of the literature show (Payne, 2010; Otzurk, 2010), in spite of the huge 
number of contributions to the analysis of the relationship between electricity consumption and 
growth there is not a consensus neither with respect to the magnitude of the effects nor the 
direction of that effect. This lack of consensus in the empirical literature is due to the 
differences in energy consumption patterns, different countries characteristics regarding their 
stage of development and institutional aspects, heterogeneity in climate conditions and the 
time period chosen for the studies (Payne, 2010; Ozturk, 2010). 
The multiplicity of results gives support to different hypotheses. More specifically, this 
relationship can be synthesized into four testable hypotheses (Payne, 2010): 
The first one, in the context of a Granger-causality approach, is “the growth hypothesis”. This 
hypothesis is based on the idea that energy, together with labour and capital, is a main driver of 
economic growth. It is supported if an increase in energy consumption causes an increase in the 
real gross domestic product (GDP). A main policy implication would be that energy conservation 
policies could have a negative effect on economic growth 
On the other hand, “the conservation hypothesis” is supported if an increase in real GDP causes 
an increase in energy consumption. This would imply that energy conservation policies, such as 
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greenhouse emission reductions, efficiency improvement measures or management policies 
whose aim is to reduce energy consumption would not adversely affect real GDP. 
Regarding the third theory, “the neutrality hypothesis”, the absence of Granger-causality is 
assumed. Energy consumption is regarded as a small component of real GDP or it is not 
correlated with GDP and therefore its change should not have a significant impact on economic 
growth. In this case, it is expected that energy policies do not affect economic growth. 
The last one, “the feedback hypothesis”, suggests that energy consumption and real GDP are 
jointly determined and may serve as complements to one another. This approach is supported 
statistically when there is evidence of bi-directional Granger-causality. Again, policies that foster 
the efficiency in energy consumption may not adversely affect real GDP. 
To sum up, the literature review suggests that, whereas a negative effect of energy regulation 
on electricity consumption can be expected, the final effect on economic growth is not 
conclusive and it is a matter of empirical analysis. The surveys of the empirical literature on the 
electricity consumption-growth nexus have emphasized the convenience to use multivariate 
models and to support the empirical analysis on well-established theoretical frameworks to 
include all the relevant control variables. Therefore, our empirical estimations are based on the 
theory of economic growth (Solow, 1956; Romer, 1990) that provides a formal framework for 
the analysis of the determinants of growth and the ensuing effects on electricity consumption. 
 
3. MODEL, VARIABLES AND METHODS 
The approach to estimate the impacts of electricity regulation on growth is based on the theory 
of economic growth and on the relationship between electricity consumption and growth. In 
the framework of growth theory, the contribution of production factors to economic growth is 
analysed. In our empirical analysis it is assumed, as has been pointed out above, that electricity 
regulation potentially affects economic growth through its impact on electricity consumption. 
Therefore, we use a system of two equations that is estimated in two stages. The first stage of 
the econometric model captures the impact of electricity regulation on electricity consumption, 
controlling for the other observable factors that affect this consumption (Eq. 1). In particular, 
our purpose is to analyse the effects of renewable energy promotion costs and industrial 
networks costs. The second stage captures the impact of electricity consumption (the estimated 
6
 
 
value from the first stage) on economic growth, controlling for the other observable factors of 
production (capital and employment) which have a direct impact on economic growth (Eq. 2).  
 
 
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀31𝑖𝑡  (1) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠̂ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀32𝑖𝑡              (2) 
 
where a full description of the variables and its sources are provided in Table 1. In order to carry 
out the empirical estimation, a dataset for the period 2007-2013 and 22 European countries has 
been compiled based on EUROSTAT database and CEER reports. The information for 22 
countries and 7 years allows us to have an appropriate panel of data in order to apply panel-
data models, which have substantial advantages with respect to estimation techniques which 
use cross-section data, including the capacity to control for individual heterogeneity, a greater 
degree of freedom and a greater variability.  
- INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE- 
Special mention deserves the regulatory variable capturing the promotion costs related to the 
support for RES-E, Renewable Promotion Costs (RPC). Unlike all other variables used in this 
analysis, the information required to identify the impact of renewable electricity support costs 
is not directly available in a standardized public or private database. This novel variable, based 
on the information provided by the Council of European Energy Regulators reports (CEER 2011, 
2013, 2015), was built as follows. First, the total expenditures on RES-E promotion were 
calculated as the product of the RES-E weighted average support level by technology (from CEER 
reports) multiplied by the overall RES-E production (from EUROSTAT). Then, the Renewable 
Promotion Cost (RPC) was calculated as the ratio between the total expenditure on RES-E 
promotion and the total electricity consumption (from EUROSTAT). Therefore, the resulting 
variable is measured on €/MWh units. This variable allows capturing the degree of these 
regulated costs taking into account the size of the electricity system (in terms of MWh of 
electricity generation), which facilitates cross-country comparisons. Table 2 provides the 
summary of the descriptive statistics for this and the other variables used in this study. 
- INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE- 
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Table 3 contains the correlation matrix which provides relevant information on the relation 
between the variables included in our model. This correlation matrix had helped us to reject the 
presence of multicollineality which could arise if there was a high correlation between the 
explanatory variables. Therefore, it has been useful to develop the specification of the model to 
perform the empirical analysis. 
- INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE- 
Before we carry out the empirical estimation, we test the nature of the evolution of the 
relationship between the two main variables (GDP and Econs) over time. Regarding this 
relationship, two or more cross-sectional time series are cointegrated if they share a common 
stochastic drift, and only integrated variables can be cointegrated. Therefore we need to test for 
the integration of the variables before proceeding with cointegration. We performed two tests, 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and the Phillips–Perron (PP) 
test (Phillips–Perron, 1988), both under the null hypothesis of a unit root (integration of first 
order). The results for both tests confirmed that the series were not integrated in levels and, 
hence, that it was not necessary to test for cointegration (see Table 4). This means that the 
variables might depend on themselves (with a coefficient lower than one) and may affect each 
other but they do not move together within the period for the countries being considered. 
Moreover, these results confirm that we can use the variables either in levels or logarithms. The 
last option (logarithmical) is deemed the appropriate functional form in the growth equation 
based in a Coob-Douglas production function. 
- INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE- 
The empirical estimation is performed using the aforementioned database through the 
implementation of the following panel data econometric techniques. In the first stage, the 
consumption equation (Eq. 1) is estimated with the Arellano-Bond method for dynamic panel 
data. This allow us to avoid the potential bias coming from the endogeneity which generally 
features a dynamic process. The estimated values of electricity consumption, capturing the 
estimated effects of regulation (RPC and NC), are recovered and stored. In the second stage, the 
estimated values of the first stage are introduced into the growth equation (Eq. 2). It is then 
estimated with fixed effect panel data techniques. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
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Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the estimations of the two equations used to assess the 
effects of the two regulations, renewable energy promotion costs and industrial network cost, 
on electricity consumption and GDP.  
- INSERT TABLES 5 & 6 AROUND HERE- 
The results for the effects of the two regulations on electricity consumption and GDP show the 
expected negative sign, are statistically significant and their magnitudes are reasonable. In both 
cases we are assuming, as we explained in the description of the model, that the impact on GDP 
takes place through the effects on electricity consumption. Renewable promotion costs and 
network costs caused an increase in the electricity prices that, as our estimations show, have a 
negative effect on electricity consumption. Our results of the estimation of the growth equation 
support the “growth hypothesis” regarding the relation between electricity consumption and 
growth. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that energy, together with labour and 
capital, is a factor of production and a driver of economic growth. Therefore, the reduction of 
electricity consumption negatively affects economic growth with a decrease in GDP levels.  
These estimations allow therefore assessing these two regulatory instruments and having a 
proper estimation of their quantitative effects on the levels of GDP. Nevertheless, our analysis 
focuses only on the direct effects of regulation on electricity consumption and GDP and does 
not consider other possible, indirect effects that, for instance, the promotion of renewable 
energies may have on technological innovation and potentially on economic growth. 
The estimation of the elasticities regarding the effects of renewable energy promotion costs 
presented in Table 7 shows that an increase of 1% in these costs leads to a decrease of 0.03% in 
electricity consumption and a reduction of  0.006% in the GDP level which, in absolute terms, 
means a 28.6M€ decrease. Departing from the assumption that there are not any additional 
regulatory changes during the period, the long-run elasticities are, as expected lower, although 
only slightly, than the short-term elasticities.  
- INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE- 
The parameter of the estimations of the other regulatory variable, the network cost, are also 
negative (see Table 8). The estimations of the elasticities show that an increase of 1% in these 
costs leads to a decrease of 0.06% in electricity consumption and of 0.01% in the GDP level. In 
absolute terms this means a reduction of 55.8M€. Again, long-term elasticities are slightly lower 
than the short-term elasticities. 
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- INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE- 
The comparison of both regulatory instruments shows that in relative terms the quantitative 
effects on the GDP are higher for network costs than for renewable promotion costs. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to be cautious in this comparison because they are significantly 
different in monetary terms, with the effects from a 1% increase in the network costs being 
higher than from a 1% increase in the renewables promotion costs.  
Besides, while a 1% increase in the network costs is in average equivalent to 0.29€/MWh, the 
same increase in the renewables promotion costs is in average equivalent to 0.14€/MWh. 
Therefore, when comparing the results from the two regulated variables, these are in line with 
the expectations, given the estimated elasticities and their average values.    
Finally, the results corresponding to the control variables included in both equations, needed to 
avoid omitted variables and to ensure that we obtain causal relationships between regulatory 
variables and growth, are all statistically significant and show the expected signs. In the two 
estimations, corresponding to renewable promotion costs and network costs, the variables of 
the growth equation (employment, capital and productivity trend) have positive values. In 
addition, in the electricity consumption a greater participation of energy intensive sectors has a 
positive effect on electricity consumption while higher energy costs have a negative effect 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper focuses on the effects of electricity regulation on economic growth through its 
impact on electricity consumption. Although there is an extensive literature analysing the 
relationship between energy consumption and economic growth, the analysis carried out in this 
paper introduces several novelties. First, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study that 
has estimated the specific effects of electricity regulation on economic growth, taking into 
account their effects on electricity consumption. Second, the paper considers two different 
instruments to disentangle the effects of regulation on growth: renewable promotion costs and 
network costs. Third, the renewable promotion costs have been calculated in a standardized 
way to allow cross-country comparison.  
In our analysis we have examined the relationship between electricity regulation and economic 
growth through the effect that regulation has on the consumption of electricity. In our 
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estimations we have included other variables, such as the participation of intensive energy 
sectors or the stock of capital that may mediate this relationship. Nevertheless, in this analysis 
we have focused specifically on the potential effects of electricity regulation on growth. 
Although this is an important area, the linkages between electricity regulation and growth are 
complex and may be affected by different variables, such as investment in capital goods, in 
innovation, and also by different aspects of the behaviour of firms and consumers that would be 
convenient to take into account for a comprehensive analysis of these linkages.  Despite these 
limitations, our analysis provides, as pointed out above some novelties and contributes to shed 
some light on the importance of well- designed electricity regulation and provides some 
relevant policy implications. 
The main results of the analysis show, as expected, that the effect of regulatory cost on 
electricity consumption is negative. In addition, the final effect on economic growth according 
to the estimations of the empirical analysis, is also negative. Hence, an increase in the regulated 
cost leads to a decrease in electricity consumption and to a reduction of GDP. The empirical 
results support “the growth hypothesis” regarding the relationship between electricity 
consumption and economic growth.       
A main economic implication from these results is that any decrease in electricity consumption, 
through energy conservation policies, could have a negative effect on economic growth. 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that a reduction in energy consumption may allow for an 
increase in disposable income to be spent on other products and services positively affecting 
economic growth. In addition, there are other indirect effects that are not covered by our 
analysis, so it is necessary to be prudent with our conclusions. It should also be highlighted that 
this by no means contradicts some recent reports (i.e. IEA, 2016) which suggest that CO2 
emissions are decoupled from economic growth at the world level. Taking into account that a 
close  relationship between electricity consumption and growth is observed, increased  
decoupling of growth and CO2 emissions is possible if electricity demand is increasingly covered 
with RES-E (as suggested by IEA, 2016) or if CCS technologies improve. 
In addition, there are regulatory implications, in the sense that any regulation increasing the 
price of energy will have a negative effect on economic growth. This is an important message 
for regulators and policy makers involved in the design of regulatory measures affecting prices. 
It also allows for the use of regulation as a tool to promote economic growth. This is in contrast 
to what is advocated by some authors in terms of the use of energy taxes on electricity prices as 
a superior option to promoting energy efficiency (Filipovic et al., 2015).   
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The effect of the regulatory cost on prices seems to indicate that a revision of the current 
framework is required. These results reinforce the need to search for market-based regulatory 
mechanisms that would potentially generate less disruption on prices. This idea is in line with 
the approach that has been taken by the EC in the most recent energy policy proposal package 
“Clean energy for all Europeans” (EC, 2016). The Commission sought to transform the energy 
regulatory framework, emphasising the predominant role that market-based instruments 
should have in this sector. 
The changes implemented during recent years by several European countries in renewable 
promotion mechanisms are clear examples of an increasing market approach. Moving from 
Feed-in Tariff to Feed-in Premium or to an auctioning system it is intended to reduce the burden 
on promotion costs. Another alternative in the case of renewable promotion cost is to avoid 
financing climate policy through the price of energy, for instance by using funds from the public 
budget. This would simultaneously profit society from the indirect benefits related to renewable 
deployment and innovation, while increasing potential growth through a direct effect on 
electricity prices.  
The case of network costs is more complex. Given their natural monopoly features, network 
costs are traditionally covered through regulated fees. An alternative approach could be to 
implement innovative solutions allowing for cost reductions, while keeping the competitiveness 
and investment levels of the companies that are managing the networks, hence, maintaining or 
increasing the quality of service. For instance, given the economic and environmental costs of 
electricity losses (Davi-Arderius et al. 2017), measures to decrease losses could reduce the 
impact on prices related to network cost.  In this regard, some options include  increasing 
efficiency in distribution network management through a more active role of DSOs or linking 
payments to  the operator’s ability to introduce innovation -for instance in the deployment of 
smart grids. In addition, higher network efficiency could be promoted in the transmission level 
encouraging the cross-border interconnection that is expected to increase price convergence as 
well as the number of players in the markets. Finally, measures that promote conveniently 
located Distributed Generation could help to solve grid congestion problems and partially avoid 
the new investment required.  
From the results of the paper, we infer that electricity regulation needs some help to moderate 
the estimated negative impact that is caused to growth through prices. Policy makers should 
carefully assess the effects the existing and new regulation can have on growth. Furthermore, 
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complementary policies that moderate those effects and are able to introduce additional 
economic incentive should be looked for. 
To alleviate the impact on economic growth that lower energy consumption generates a series 
of policy measures needs to be undertaken to promote energy efficiency. The benefits of energy 
efficiency policies are multiple affecting everything from macroeconomic performance, 
environment and industry to energy prices (IEA, 2015). As is stated in the Energy Efficiency 
Directive proposal recently launched by the European Commission, energy efficiency is 
considered to trigger growth, job creation and investment (EC, 2016). In this sense, promoting 
energy efficiency will have positive spillovers on job creation and demand for new appliances 
and services creating an indirect impact on economic growth. For instance, one recent paper 
that explores the effects of energy efficiency on economic growth (Bataille & Melton, 2017) 
shows increases in GDP, employment and welfare. In addition, promoting energy efficiency will 
allow for the decoupling of economic growth and energy consumption thereby reducing the 
energy intensity of the economy. Less energy needed per unit of output clearly helps to 
minimize the negative impact of regulation can have on energy prices and consequently on 
economic growth. However, governments should be cautious with policy implementation 
because energy efficiency could jeopardize the expected positive outcome through a rebound 
effect. 
What may be concluded from this paper is that regulatory design should target an efficient 
allocation of resources, minimizing the effect on prices. Given the positive relationship between 
electricity consumption and economic growth found in this empirical study, a regulatory policy 
increasingly reliant  on market mechanisms should be designed and implemented, in order to 
achieve the regional objectives for renewables, energy efficiency and CO2 reduction. These 
market mechanisms could be expected to contain regulatory costs to promote renewables -and 
other costs from policies aiming at energy efficiency or CO2 mitigation. In the case of networks 
there is potential for cost containment with the development of innovative regulatory solutions. 
Nevertheless, any regulatory change should not harm the competitiveness of the sector or its 
operators, and should not risk the achievement of the energy and environmental targets of 
European energy policy for 2030. Trade-offs between different goals are likely, however. 
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Table 1. The variables. Definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source of 
data 
 Equation 1  
Electricity consumption 
(Econs) 
(dependent variable) 
Final energy consumption-electricity (MWh) Eurostat 
Economic growth (GDP) Gross domestic product (Billions €) Eurostat 
RES-E promotion costs 
(RPC) 
RES-E promotion cost (€/MWh) CEER, Own 
Network costs -industrial 
(NC) 
Transmission and distribution tariffs; 
transmission and distribution losses; after-sale 
services; system service costs and meter 
rental.  (€/MWh) 
Eurostat 
Energy cost (EC)  Wholesale Cost and Retail Margin for 
Industrial Consumers  
Eurostat 
Intensive energy sectors 
(IS) 
Energy intensive sectors activity (percentage 
of economic activity) (€/MWh) 
Eurostat 
 Equation 2  
Economic growth (GDP) 
(dependent variable) 
Gross domestic product (Billions €) Eurostat 
Employment (EMP) Number of employees. Total economy (1000 
persons) 
Eurostat 
Capital (K) Net capital stock, constant prices.  
Total economy (2010 prices) 
Eurostat 
Productivity Trend (PT) Total productivity trend. Total economy  
(Index 2010=100) 
Eurostat 
Electricity consumption 
(Econs) 
Estimated value 
Final energy consumption-electricity (MWh) – 
Estimated values from first stage 
Eurostat 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP 252 463.92 700.00 5.96 2,681.59 
PT 224 101.67 3.91 92.41 117.52 
K 224 1,271.94 2,177.88 0.74 7,845.83 
EMP 224 8,081.55 10,448.78 153.51 42,226.00 
Econs 196 100,189,224.49 134,899,234.89 1,707,000.00 532,424,000.00 
RPC 154 14.36 10.63 0.50 55.29 
EC 180 68.58 27.88 26.90 201.20 
NC 180 28.95 10.83 3.50 72.40 
IS 196 11.08 6.44 0.00 33.81 
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
 GDP PT K EMP Econs RPC EC NC IS 
GDP 1.000         
PT -0.092 1.000        
K 0.986 -0.095 1.000       
EMP 0.962 -0.087 0.937 1.000      
Econs 0.986 -0.107 0.963 0.965 1.000     
RPC 0.271 -0.109 0.315 0.250 0.267 1.000    
EC 0.378 -0.286 0.419 0.359 0.337 0.324 1.000   
NC -0.225 0.184 -0.247 -0.142 -0.235 -0.077 -0.329 1.000  
IS 0.122 -0.068 0.110 0.170 0.171 0.076 0.233 -0.035 1.000 
 
Table 4. Unit root tests for GDP and ECONS 
Variable Statistic ADF (p-value) PP (p-value) 
GDP Inverse Chi-squared 2,65628E-09 0,007609123 
  Inverse Normal 2,832E-06 0,009314395 
  Inverse Logit 7,03071E-08 0,008937038 
  Modified inv. chi-squared 4,44089E-16 0,003151377 
Econs Inverse Chi-squared 2,32213E-38 3,63143E-18 
  Inverse Normal 1,89146E-14 5,05593E-09 
  Inverse Logit 0 4,26326E-14 
  Modified inv. chi-squared 0 0 
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Table 5. Estimations results. First stage: Electricity consumption equation 
Dep. Econs 
L.econs -0.225***
(0.00880) 
GDP 80,457*** 
(665.1) 
NC -216,688***
(22,168) 
EC -51,209***
(12,946) 
IS 136,203*** 
(43,550) 
RPC -224,281***
(19,342) 
Constant 8.194e+07*** 
(9.277e+06) 
Observations 103 
Number of id 22 
Pseudo R2 0.5474 
Table 6. Estimations results. Second stage: Growth equation 
Dep. GDP 
lEMP 0.556*** 
(0.0472) 
lK 0.640*** 
(0.0357) 
𝐥𝐄𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬̂ 0.192*** 
(0.0558) 
PT 0.0110*** 
(0.000582) 
Constant -7.474***
(0.896) 
Observations 126 
Number of id 22 
R2 0.935 
19
 
 
 
Table 7. Elasticities of consumption and growth to renewable energy promotion costs 
 Consumption Growth 
Short-run Elasticity in % -0.032 -0.006 
Short-run Effect in MWh & M€ -32,207 -28.63 
Long-run Elasticity in % -0.026 -0.005 
Long-run Effect in MWh & M€ -26,291 -23.37 
 
Table 8. Elasticities of consumption and growth to network costs  
 
Consumption Growth 
Short-run Elasticity in % -0.063 -0.012 
Short-run Effect in MWh & M€ -62,731 -55.77 
Long-run Elasticity in % -0.051 -0.010 
Long-run Effect in MWh & M€ -51,209 -45.53 
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